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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WILFORD LESLIE NEVES and
GLORIA GAY NEVES, his wife
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 16910

-vsBRUCE EARL WRIGHT and
SHONNIE C. WRIGHT, his wife
Defendants and
Appellants .
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE

The nature of the case was stated accurately by the
appellants and need not be restated here.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable
George E. Ballif, who entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff -respondents.buyers and against the defendant -appellants
sellers.

The Court in entering a Memorandum decision stated

as follows:
"The Court finds that the failure of the defendants
to disclose the fact that they did not have title to
the property at the time the contract was a breach
of contract by defendants entitling plaintiffs to
rescind the contract of sale. (Leavitt v. Blohm,
11 U.Zd 220. The instant case is stronger on the
facts because here defendant had no title at the
time of the sale.)"
The Court found at the Motion for Summary Judgment
stage "that the defendants were out-of-title"
(Rec • 112 : 15 -18)
-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court then awarded.to the Plaintiffs $3,000.00 plus
the cash paid under the~contract less $200.00 per ~onth
rental for the period of occupancy.

Based upon such

decision, the plaintiffs-respondents submitted a judgment which included $1,918.00 attorney's fees and $604.SO
interest.

Defendants-appellants made a motion to strike

the .attorney's fees.

The.~motion was granted and after

the ruling on attorney's fees, defendants-appellants
filed their Notice of .Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief sought on appeal has been correctly
stated and need not be restated here.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts given by the appellants is,
in the most part, completely irrelevant and immaterial.
Skipping page three· and most of page four brings us to
the first full paragraph where the relevant facts begin.
The plaintiff-respondents purchased a home from the
defendant-appellant on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the
first copy of which was dated April 19, 1977 (Ex. 9, R.
106:15-18)
The defendants, Bruce E. Wright and Shonnie C. Wright,
executed a Quit Claim Deed (Ex. 4) on April 11, 1977,
conveying all of their interest in the property involved
herein to a third party.
On April 19, 1977, the plaintiff-respondents and
-2-
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defendant-appellants entered into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract (Ex. 9, Rec. 106:15-18).

No disclosure was made

to the plaintiff-respondents by the defendant-appellants
that the sellers, in fact, had no legal title to the
property they were selling.

(Rec. 143:4-6).

Plaintiffs

took possession and began making payments upon the purchase
contract to appellants and to First Security Bank, the
first mortgage holder.
On May 31, 1977, the parties, with a proper legal
description, re-signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract
(Ex. Rec. 105:21-29) and executed an escrow agreement,
(Ex. S).

The appellants even signed a Warranty Deed on

May 31, 1977 to the property they did not own (Ex.2)
falsely and fraudulently warranting that they owned the
property.
During all of this time and through all of these
contracts sellers failed to reveal to buyers that they
had deeded the property to a third party.

In February

of 1978, plaintiff-respondents became aware through an
examination of the County Recorder's Office that the
defendant-appellants had conveyed the property to a
third party.

By this time respondents had paid appellants

$7,555.44 for property respondents did not own.

Through

counsel, plaintiff-respondents sent notices that they
were vacating the property, tendering the property back
to the appellant-sellers and refusing to make further
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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payments.

Plaintiff-respondents' letters were received

in evidence as Exhibits 6, 7·and 8.

Mr. Neves, the

plaintiff-respondent, stated clearly that he would not
have purchased the property if he had known that the
title had been transferred.
A•••• "Had I known the facts of the case, that he
didn't-have a deed to the property, that only a
week before he had deeded it to his parents, I
would not have entered into the contract." (Re. 118 :4-8)
The plaintiff-respondent then commenced an action to
rescind the contract and for damages.

The lower Court found

for the plaintiff-respondent and granted damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS REPRESENTED AND WARRANTED
THAT THEY OWNED THE PROPERTY WHICH REPRESENTATION
WAS FALSE AND FRAUDULENT. SUCH A MATERIAL AND
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION IS A BASIS FOR RECISSION
OF THE CONTRACT BY THE BUYER.
The defendants told plaintiffs they owned the proper·
ty in question, represented that they owned the property
in the two real estate contracts (Ex. 1 and 9) and warranted that they owned it in the Warranty Deed dated May
31, 1977 (Ex. 2).

By conveying the property to a third party by Quit
Claim Deed without any written reservation the defendantappellant transferred all of their interest in the property, Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western, 95 Ut. 279,
80 P.2d 338 also 112 Ut. 52, 185 P.2d 264.

Clearly after

defendant-respondent conveyed the property to a third
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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party by Quit Claim Deed they had no interest to sell
and any attempt to sell something they didn't own was fraud.
In the BYU Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol.
1 Section 59 under the title of "Quality of Title the
Vendee is to receive" we read:
"Where mutual assent does not occur due to the presence of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, in
establishing the contractual relationship, then the
contract is never formed."
Section 57-1-3 Utah Code Annotated states the respondents had a right to rely on the document given them
as evidence··of clear title.
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to
pass by·a conveyance of real estate, unless it
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate
was in tende·d."
The case of Elder v. Clawson, 14 Ut. 2d. 379, 384
P. 2d 802 (1963) held purchasers could rescind for fraud
when sellers failed to mention a quarantine for a noxious
weed and held "silence may become actionable fraud where
it relates to a material matter known to the party •••• "
Certainly nothing could be more material then representations as to who actually owns the land being transferred.
The plaintiff-respondent could rescind the contract and
did.

Section 8.60 states:
"A party may claim the right to rescind a contract
but to do so he must evidence intent to rescind
by some unequivocal act, either by explicit notice
or some act from which notice may be implied."

In our case the plaintiff-respondents gave immediate
notice of recission and vacated the premises as soon as
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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they discovered· the fraud.

In.Frailey v. McGarry, 116

Ut. 504, 211 P.2d 840, the Court acknowledged the right
to rescind for false representations but held when the
plaintiff delayed a year he, in effect, ratified the
contract.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS HAD A RIGHT TO PRESUME
THEY WERE PAYING FOR AND RECEIVING PROPERTY OWNED
BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS AND THE FAILURE OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS TO DISCLOSE THE FACT THAT THEY
DID NOT HAVE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME THE
CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO WAS A BREACH OF CONTRACT
BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS ENTITLING PLAINTIFF.:.RESPONDENTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE.
The signing of a Uniform Real Estate Contract by
the parties was a conveyance of the property.

Section

57-1-1 defines conveyance as follows:
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this title shall
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing
by which any real estate, or interest in real estate,
is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for a term not exceeding one year."
The buyers in this case had the right to presume
the defendant-appellant sellers had title to the property
conveyed.

Section 57-1-3 states:

"A fee simple title is presumed to be intend~d to
pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate
was intended."
Any desire of the defendant-appellant sellers to give
the property to someone else for whatever reason should be
included in the conveyance document.

The summary of Utah

Real Property Law, Vol. I, Section 8.14 states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"(l) A
sim le absolute is
terms.
y es1re o t e ven or to retain a portion of the estate or joint title, or give another
portion, remainder or other joint title, to someone
else should be included." (underlining added)
A contract may be rescinded if the seller cannot convey his title free·from all but agreed upon encumbrances.
Section 8.15 states in part, as follows:
"Generally, a contract may be rescinded if the vendor
cannot convey his title free from all but mutually
agreed upon encumbrances." (Thackery v. Knight,
57 Ut.21, 192 P.263 (1920).
The cases cited by the defendant-appellants to the
effect that seller need not have a marketable title do
not apply in our case.
In all of the cases cited by the defendant-appellant
only nominal defects were involved.

Case Woodward v.

Allen, 1 Ut. 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953), for instance, the
purchaser signed an agreement in the evening then stopped
payment on his check the next morning.
the purchaser's complaint

The Court found

about a marketable title was

an after thought being merely an attempt to get out of
the contract.

The seller had title but merely had some

clouds on it to be cleared.

There were no material

defects nor were there any material representations involved.
In the case Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Ut. 2d 220, 357 P. 2d
190, both the trial court and the Supreme Court agreed on
the same principal we (plaintiff-respondents) are contending here that purchaser has the right to rescind when
seller, by conveying title, had clouded the title.

The
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trial court gave damagesto purchaser but the upper court,
though agreeing that there was a right to rescind, equivocated on damages because purchaser had not offered to
return the property but merely moved out and abandoned the
premises and did not even ask for return of money until
the time for a counterclaim.

The Court struck out the

counterclaim Judgment to purchaser but affirmed the recission.
Even in cases where seller lost or gave up his title
the cases uniformly hold the purchaser could rescind.

In

the case Marlowe v. Radmall, 26 Ut. 2d 124, 485 P. 2d
1402, the Court held purchaser

~ould

rescind:

It is true that ordinarily such a vender does not
necessarily have to have marketable title until the
purchaser has made his payments. Nevertheless, if it
plainly appears that he has so lost or encumbered
his ownership or his title that he will not be able
to fulfill his contract he cannot insist that the
Purchaser continue to· make· ·p·ayments when it is obvious
that his own performance will not be forthcoming."
This case refers back to Leavitt case and cites Tremonton
Investment v. Home, 59 Ut. 156, 202 P. 547; 55 Am Jur. 624,
Vender and Purchaser, Sec. 154.
In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2nd 520, (1978) the
Court held that the seller breached the contract in not
being able to convey the other half of the 80 acres
contracted for by the purchaser.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS LOST ALL INTEREST IN THE
REAL PROPERTY WHEN THEY CONVEYED IT BY A QUIT CLAIM
-8-
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DEED AND NO SUCH THING AS AN ORAL TRUST OR ANY OTHER
KIND OF SO-CALLED RESERVATION OF INTEREST IS VALID
UNLESS THE ORAL TRUST OR RESERVATION OF INTEREST IS
IN WRITING.
A deed is a written instrument which.,when properly
executed, conveys any interest in real property, 23
Am. Jur. 2d Deeds Sec. 1.

A Quit Claim Deed "will pass

all rights, title, interest and estate of the granter at
the date of the conveyance" Summary of Utah Real Property
Law, Vol. 1 Chapter II Deeds Sec. 2.2; Ninx v. Tooele
County, 101 Ut. 84, 118 P.2d 376 (1941) Ruthrauff v. Silver
King Western (Supra).

Such instruments are construed in

favor of the grantee, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Ut.
123, 255 P. 2d 989, 993 (1953).
A DELIVERED RECORDED DEED TO 3rd PARTY FURTHER PRECLUDED ALL CLAIM OF TITLE BY PLAINTIFFRESPONDENTS.
The law says there must be a delivery of the deed to
the grantee.

In our case the deed was not only delivered

by the Defendants to a 3rd party but the deed was recorded.

The very purpose of recording is to give:
"All subsequent·purchasers and mortgagees constructive notice of the existence and contents of the
recorded instruments." "A major premise of the law
of real property is the rule that "first in time is
first in right" "the first-created of two competing
interest has priority". Sec. 2-.38 S.U.R.P.L. Also
see Powell, The Law of Real Property, Sec. 912.
"Constructive notice deals with title to land. Proper
recordation gives all prospective subsequent grantees
contructive notice of the existence and contents of
the recorded instruments. In essence, there can be
no subsequent bonafide purchaser·s he·cause anyone wishing to be a grantee will be said to he ·an constructive
notice of the deed since he has a duty to search the
chain of title. A proper search will uncover a proper-9-
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ly recorded deed", S.U R.:P.L. Sec. 2.40.
0

Section 57-3-2~of the Utah Code provides:
'.'Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real.estate, executed, or acknowledged or proved
and certified, in the matter prescribed by this titl~
and every patent to lands within this state duly
'
:xecuted and verified according to law, and every
Judgment, order or decree of any court or record in
this state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be
recorded in the office of the county recorder, and
every financing statement which complies with the
provisions· of section 70A-9-402 shall, from the time
of filing the same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof;
·and s·ubs·e· ue·n:t · ur·chaser mort agees and lienholders
· shall
·to· · ur·c ase
ta e·
:no·tice."
"To illustrate the above statute assume that 0 conveys
to B. B records. 0 then conveys to C, who had no
actual notice of the prior conveyance. B prevails
over C because C was given constructive notice by
proper recordation. "S.U.R.P.L. Se·c. 2.40.
This illustration is identical to our case, 0 being the
appellants-and C being the respondents.

The appellants

might just as well have sold the respondents the Brooklyn
Bridge.

In the end the respondents, C, would get nothing.

Unfortunately respondents did not check the recorders
office before signing the contracts but, fortunately,
respondents did check the recorder's office before they
had paid out more money to appellants who had no recorded title or interest in the property they were selling.
ALL TERMS AFFECTING AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY
MUST BE IN WRITING. AN ORAL TRUST IN A REAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTION IS VOID.
There was nothing on the appellant's Quit Claim Deed to
the 3rd party indicating the 3rd party was to hold the
-10-
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property in trust. -All agreements connected with real
estate transactions must be in writing.

Counsel for

appellants has repeatedly referred to the agreement between appellants and the 3rd party was an "Oral Trust".
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, dealing with the
Statute of Frauds, states as follows:
"No estate or interest in real property, other than
Teases for a term not exceeding one year, no·r any
trust or ower over or concernin real r6 ~rt
or 1n·any manner re at1ng t ereto, s a·· -~ ·~r~at~d,
granted, ~ssigned, s~rrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyanc~ ·in writing subscribed by the party creating
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing." (underlining added)
In fact the law says an oral agreement or oral trust not a
part of the deed or a written contract is VOID.

Section

25-5-3 reads as follows:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the con ...
tract or some note or memo·randum there.of, 1s· 1n
wr1t1ng subscribed by the partr by whom the lease
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing." (underlining added)
Section 57-1-6 discussing trusts and trustees states that
recording real estate transactions is necessary to impart
notice and states in part as follows:
"Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as
herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration,
nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument is
designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise p·urports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, shall
operate to charge any third person with notice of
the interest of any person or persons not named in
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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such instrument or of the grantor or grantors; but
the· · r·an:te·e· ·may ·co·nve· · the fe·e ·or such les·ser interest
as· ·was· ·c·o·nveye· · ·to· · ·i·m y s·uc · ins trtime·nt ree· ·an
· ·cTe·ar ·o'f aTl claims· ·not disclosed hy the "in:stniment
·o·r· by ·an ins·tr·ume·n:t ·re·cor"ded as herein provided setting
~orth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the
i~terest claimed and describing the property charged
with such· interest." (underlining added)':
In other words the appellants could have conveyed to the
3rd party

by~writing

in the trust relationship but since

no trust relationship was established by the deed itself
the grante·e-third party _could convey the property "free
and clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument".
Sections 57-1-19 through 36 provide detailed instructions
on trust sales. ··Having some 16 sections of law referring
to trust arrangements shows how concerned Utah is about
sales of real property connected with trust agreements.
The appellants should have done two things which they did
not do, that is:
1. The appellants should have had such an agreement
acknowledgment from 3rd Party before executing the
Quit Claim Deed and preferably the agreement should
have been part of the deed.
2. The appellants should have advised the respondents
of the Quit Claim Deed and trust arrangements before
the contract signing so respondents would have "actual
notice" of the document and arrangement.
The respondents can only take a recorded document for
its face value and had full right to avoid or rescind an
agreement when the appellants sold them property which they
represented they owned especially when the respondents
had to find out, by their own investigation, that the
appellants, in fact, had no title whatsoever to the properey
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sold.
The dangers of such a transfer, no matter what the
intent is obvious. ¥If the appellants died the knowledge
of an oral agreement dies with them and 3rd party owns the
property free and clear.

If the 3rd party died the property

belongs to their estate clear and simply.

The dead

man statute precludes testimony concerning the intent of
oral agreements·of the dead man.

Even if the 3rd party

decided to deny the oral agreement there would be serious
problems.

If creditors attached the property of the 3rd

party, the oral agreement would be invalid.
POINT IV
ADMITTEDLY DEFENDANT -APPELLANTS TRANSFERRED THE
PROPERTY TO 'A THIRD PARTY TO THWART CREDITORS. THE
COURT SHOULD NOT REWARD THIS ATTEMPT TO DEFRAUD
CREDITORS.
By Defendants own admission the transfer to a 3rd
party was to thwart creditors.

Transfers to defraud

creditors are Fraud and against Public policy.

Section

25-1-11 Utah Code Annotated states:
"All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assign
ments, verbal or ~ritten, of goods, chattels, or
things in action made in trust for the use of the
person making the same shall be void as against the
existing ·or subsequent creditors of such person."
Obviously appellants should not seek equity in this
Court because of their acts calculated to defraud creditors.

Certainly this court should not give credence to

reasons behind the scenes for a transfer of property
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when reasons were fraudulent and unlawful.
POINT V
DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY CALCULATED
For damages the respondents should recover the
$3,000.00 agreed value of the down payment for land given,
plus the $2,000.00 additional down payment and the amount
of $2,555.44 paid out in monthly payments for a total of
$7,555.44 less reasonable rental value which the evidence
shows was $200.00 per month for nine months or $1,800.00
for a final total of $5,755.44 plus costs and interest.
CONCLUSION
Respondents urge the Court to find that the facts
which are not in dispute and the law support the decision
of the trial court and pray the court deny the appeal
and uphold the award of the lower court.
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